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English and French Canadian Public Opinion on Jews and Israel: Some Poll Data

ABSTRACT/RESUME

The article discusses those social differences between French and English Canadians which might lead to differences in attitudes toward Jews. It points to the greater cultural homogeneity of the French as a reason for expecting less friendly attitudes. These expectations are confirmed by a secondary analysis of public opinion surveys which were conducted between 1965 and 1975. Even after controlling for educational and socio-economic differences, French Canadians are notably less friendly to Jews than English Canadians. A detailed analysis of two of the surveys strengthens an interpretation in terms of traditional and cultural causes, rather than narrowly political ones.

L'article considère celles des différences sociales entre canadiens anglais et canadiens français qui pourraient susciter un écart en ce qui concerne les attitudes à l'égard des juifs. L'homogénéité culturelle plus prononcée chez les canadiens français amènerait à s'attendre à d'attitudes moins amicales. Cette expectative se confirme dans l'optique d'une analyse secondaire des enquêtes faites entre 1965 et 1975. Les canadiens français sont, en effet, sensiblement moins amicaux envers le juifs que les canadiens anglais, et cette différence ne s'explique ni par une différence de niveau de scolarité ni par couche sociale. Une analyse plus approfondie de deux des enquêtes suggère que la cause de cet écart se trouve dans les domaines traditionnels et culturels plutôt qu'étroitement politiques.

Jews make up less than two per cent of the Canadian population, and their proportion in the world is even smaller. But modern history has cast them as something of a weathervane and the study of attitudes toward them has often yielded more general insights.

In this paper I study differences between French Canadian and English Canadian opinions on matters related to Jews. I do so in the hope of shedding light on differences between French Canadian and English Canadian social processes: in particular, the study attempts to say something about the extent and nature of French Canadian distinctiveness.

* * *

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It is surely no secret that being Jewish in a Christian world has often proved difficult. Jews have been small and conspicuous minorities in Europe for centuries: more often than not they have been objects of derision, exclusion, violence, and worse. But it is equally well accepted that the North American continent, on the whole, has been more hospitable to Jews than any other part of the Christian world; in Jewish history, the New World has indeed meant a new world of acceptance and brotherhood with non-Jewish neighbors.

This contrast between Old and New Worlds has most generally been explained by the extraordinary cultural heterogeneity of this continent. Unlike Europe, where populations tend to be of one piece from the point of view of religion, language, and tradition, Jews here became one of many disparate groups and races. Consequently, they did not become available, as they had in Europe, to play the role of the scapegoat for all the ills of mankind. (Elbogen, 1946:114 ff.; Lipset, 1969; Halpern, 1958).

But French Canada has always been an exception to the otherwise heterogeneous North America. French Canadians are very much united in regard to religion, language and provenance. This is perhaps best illustrated with a few figures from recent Canadian censuses.

In 1971, fully 98% of French Canadians were able to report Canada as place of birth, but only 79% of non-French Canadians could do likewise. In the province of Quebec, 96% of the French Canadians had been born in their province of residence, which was true of only 58% of the non-French Quebecers. The religious homogeneity is even more striking: at the time of the 1961 Census, 96.2% of the native born French Canadians reported themselves to be Catholics. In contrast, other native born Canadians were very divided indeed: the single largest denomination among them—also Roman Catholicism—included only 22% of the people.

The cultural homogeneity of French Canadian Catholics may well be a factor in their attitudes toward minorities in general. (See Footnote 9 below). But it is perhaps particularly important in the case of Jews, the arch non-Christians. At any rate, a very explicit anti-Semitism has been an integral part of at least some of the influential nationalist French Canadian movements since the nineteenth century.

This anti-Semitic tradition, particularly conspicuous in certain prominent newspapers, pictured Jews as enemies of the faith, enemies of decency, enemies of civilization. The rural-based French Canadian Catholicism saw moral dangers in the city and Jews were pictured as epitomizing the urban (and capitalist) spirit. They were also denounced as dangerous atheists and Communists. In its most developed stage during the first three decades of the twentieth century, influential sectors of the French Canadian Catholic press depicted the Jews, together with Freemasons and Communists, as the greatest threat to French Canadian values. In the early days of the Hitler regime, even Nazi anti-Semitism was often praised. Anti-Jewish demonstrations and incidents were common until the full horror of German Nazism became clear for all to see: only then, near the end of World War II, did the virulent stage of French Canadian anti-Semitism finally run its course.

The anti-Semitic component of traditional French Canadian nationalism is of course a rather complex phenomenon and cannot be fully explored here. More-
over, when I stress the cultural homogeneity of French Canada as an explanatory factor, this is not to deny that there are also economic and perhaps still other factors. But it is the cultural homogeneity which contrasts most with English Canada.

Turning now to English Canada, it too, like the rest of English-speaking North America, has its history of anti-Semitism. But except for certain fringe phenomena, this anti-Semitism, as we shall see, took a characteristically different form from that in Quebec.

The fringe groups have recently been described by Betcherman (1975). During the nineteen thirties, pro-Nazi grouplets operated in both French and English Canada and spread virulently anti-Semitic propaganda. Some of the Quebec personalities in this movement had connections with French Canadian nationalism, but Betcherman finds that “from 1933 to 1935 the Western fascists were actually more numerous and better organized. . . .” (p. 45). Some mention must also be made of the rather short-lived anti-Semitism within Social Credit, in both French and English Canada. (Pinard, 1975:13, 227; MacPherson, 1962:183-4, 210, ff; Stein, 1973: 49-50.) But in contrast to the French Canadian press campaign mentioned above and the social anti-Semitism of English Canada to be mentioned presently, these marginal anti-Semitic manifestations cannot be credited with much more than an ephemeral place in Canadian history.

What may be termed anti-Semitism in English-speaking North America is, on the whole, covert. A Jewish organization published a useful outline of these phenomena in 1958 (Belth). It dealt mostly with the United States but afforded interesting insights into Canadian conditions as well. We read of persisting problems of discrimination in private schools and universities, employment discrimination in such fields as banking and insurance, bans from hotels, resorts, private clubs. The almost complete barrier to intimate personal friendships between Jews and non-Jews—perhaps due as much to Jewish as to non-Jewish desires—is a particularly noteworthy feature. (Belth, 1958:115-6). Concerning recreational accommodations, the authors tell us that “the findings in Canada revealed a somewhat worse situation than in the United States. Of the hotels about which we obtained adequate current information, we found that 28.3 per cent discriminate against Jews.” (Belth, 1958: 39). The comparable figure for the United States was 22.9%. (P. 37). No attempt was made to differentiate between French and English Canada in these data.

Upper-class bias against Jews in English Canada is further documented (Betcherman, 1975:49,ff) for the ’thirties, and is described in some detail for Ontario by Wrong, 1959:51,ff. We read here of phenomena very similar to those reported by Belth in the United States. More detail concerning social clubs and fraternities is furnished by Seeley, Sim, and Loosley (1956:329,ff), who write about the Toronto suburb of Forest Hill Village. Newman (1975:235) describes the banning of Jews from the Vancouver Club in the ’seventies, though I have been told that this club has now acquired a token Jew.

We may perhaps summarize our very brief excursion into the pre-War history of anti-Semitism in Canada as follows: during the nineteenth century and up until the end of the Second World War, anti-Semitism was prominently, overtly and sometimes virulently part of the religiously-connected French Canadian nationalism. The anti-Semitism of English Canada, on the other hand, has tended toward coverture and, one might say, hypocrisy: while equality was most
usually preached, discriminatory practices flourished widely and probably still flourish to some extent. This difference between the publicly proclaimed anti-Semitism of the French and the closet anti-Semitism of the English must be presumed to have consequences for the formation of public opinion.

We come now to the post-War period which is dominated and complicated by the existence of the State of Israel. There is no systematic study of Canadian press opinion concerning the Israel-Arab conflict, but certain spokesmen have become conspicuous supporters of one side or the other. In English Canada, only the United Church Observer is well-known for its pro-Arab stand, but no prominent English Canadian politicians have followed its lead. In French Canada, however, Premier Rene Levesque of Quebec and certain other leaders in his movement have strongly supported the Arab side of the conflict.

It is often said—more often by non-Jews than by Jews—that opposition to Israel or support to the Arabs does not necessarily imply anti-Semitism or opposition to Jews in Canada or elsewhere. The discussion by Rabbi W. Gunther Plaut of Toronto (1974:9) contributes a useful perspective:

What we need to do then is to make a clear distinction between that criticism of Israel which is legitimate and that which is in fact a cover for anti-Semitism. Christians who criticize Israel for being and existing . . . who never have anything good to say about Israel and see only her faults . . . find only good in her enemies and never their faults . . . fall into the category of anti-Semitism. But when . . . in fact the criticism is similar to internal criticism of policy within Canada, then it ought to be taken at its own worth and not be confused and weighted with epithets.

To discuss the question of Israel in the present context, then, involves us in certain complications. In addition to those mentioned by Rabbi Plaut, there is the special question of current left-wing and progressivist opposition to Israel, which is not usually couched in anti-Semitic language. There is also the problem of possible differences between what is acknowledged and what, in fact, might motivate opposition; in other words, it is at least conceivable that some feelings against Israel have anti-Semitic cultural and psychological sources without these being acknowledged. Public opinion data tell us how people have answered questions but not why they have given particular responses. Fortunately, however, there are reasonable solutions to these problems of interpretation provided that our aim is to assess group differences and not individual motivation.

First, we have both direct and indirect evidence of a positive correlation between anti-Semitic attitudes and opposition to Israel. (Lipset and Schneider, 1977:27; Stember, 1966:180; Glock and Stark, 1966:124 and passim; Forster and Epstein, 1974: Chapter 9 and passim.) This means that while an individual may well be free of anti-Semitism and still favour the Arab cause over Israel, the proportion of anti-Semites is greater among those opposing Israel than among those favouring the Jewish state. (This is surely not a surprising finding.) So any group which has a greater proportion of persons opposed to Israel, other things being equal, is also likely to have a greater proportion of anti-Semites.

Second, no one finding in a body of survey data means very much when it stands alone. Each item of information needs to be related to the others and the resulting pattern, if any, gives persuasiveness to the overall argument.
Third, these findings are meaningful only in a comparative perspective. For instance, it is not particularly helpful to learn that 20% of Group A favours Israel unless we also know that, say, 40% of Group B does. And if we find that Group A is also more likely than Group B to oppose intermarriage with Jews, a pattern begins to emerge which has more persuasiveness than either finding would have alone.

These considerations, of course, apply also to certain other items in the poll data to be reported. For instance, the anti-Semitic implications of the item in Laponce’s study (see below) become apparent only if seen in the context of all the other studies.

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Public opinion polling has existed at least since the nineteen 'thirties, but I have not found studies relevant to the purpose at hand for any period other than the most recent. The balance of this paper will examine these recent studies.

In March of 1965, the Social Research Group of McGill University asked a sample consisting of 4,071 Canadians a series of questions concerning attitudes toward various ethnic groups in the country. (McGill University, 1965).

The general tenor of the questions can be seen in the following example:

In addition to English Canadians and French Canadians, you know that there are in Canada Italian Canadians, German Canadians, Jewish Canadians, Ukrainian Canadians and Canadians of many other origins. I would like to know your opinion about these different groups of Canadians. In general, who has the most chances of getting the best jobs in Canada: the English Canadians, French Canadians, or Canadians of another group? (If Canadians of another group): Which group? (Question 0132A, 0132B).

One may suppose that questions like these could elicit any very virulent antagonisms which respondents may have felt toward the smaller minority groups. But despite such repeated prodding, no anti-Jewish virulence was detected, either among English Canadians or among French Canadians. In the question just cited, for example, fewer than one per cent in either group named Jews as over-privileged. (See Table 1). I find these results noteworthy because the anti-Semitic propaganda which we found in an earlier era among French Canadians was often insistent that Jews are getting ahead of everyone else. But this particular survey is the only one I have studied in which I found no significant difference between French and English Canadians.

**TABLE 1.** McGill Social Research Study, March 1965. N=4071

|谁的失业率较高
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other answers</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jean A. Laponce studied groups of university students in English and French Canada, as well as in the United States and in France, in the years 1967 to 1968. One of the statements which he presented to his respondents, for their reaction, was the following:

Even after he ceases to practise his religion, even if he adheres to another religion, the Jew always remains a Jew. (Variable 11).

It would seem reasonable to assume that those who feel very antagonistic toward Jews would more often agree with this kind of statement than those who feel less so. Laponce's data show that whereas only nine percent of his English Canadian students found themselves in complete agreement with the statement, nineteen percent of his French Canadian respondents answered this way.

TABLE 2. LEFT-RIGHT SURVEY . . . J. A. LAPONCE. N=534

"Even after he ceases to practise his religion, even if he adheres to another religion, the Jew always remains a Jew."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ECA</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>FCA</th>
<th>FR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree completely</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree somewhat</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree somewhat</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree completely</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(It might be noted parenthetically that five percent of the U.S. students questioned by Laponce agreed with this putatively anti-Semitic statement, while fully thirty-one percent of the sample in France agreed. So we can see that both Canadian groups are somewhere in between the extremes represented by the European French on the one hand and the Americans on the other.)

We turn now to some research reported by John Meisel in 1970. (See Table 3). In a rather complex research project, he sought to ascertain degrees of warmth which his French and English Canadian respondents feel toward a number of ethnic groups. Meisel reports these different degrees in a scale from one to ten: the higher the score, the more friendly the feeling. His English Canadian respondents give Jews a score of 6.3; his French Canadians give Jews a score of 5.5. Again, this is not a dramatic difference, but is appreciable in the whole context of Meisel's findings. Moreover, it is consistent with findings in the other surveys.

Most of the remaining data I have to report come from the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion. I was able to re-analyze, for differences between French and English Canadians, questions relating to Israel and to Jews contained in four national surveys (CIPO, 1968, 1969, 1973, 1975).

In May of 1968, CIPO asked a national sample of Canadians whether they would approve of marriages across ethnic lines. (See Table 4). Fifty-three
TABLE 3. JOHN MEISEL'S STUDY. N = 2248

Liking for Ethnic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English Canadians</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Canadians</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Canadians</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percent of English Canadians approved of marriages between Jews and non-Jews, but only forty-seven percent of French Canadians did. The difference here is not very great, and results are further complicated by fewer French Canadians than English Canadians expressing any opinion at all. It is perhaps noteworthy, however, that while the French Canadians seem somewhat less liberal than the English about the Jews, they were somewhat more liberal than the English in approving of marriages between white and non-white people (forty-five versus twenty-nine percent). 8, 92

TABLE 4. CIPO 328, MAY 1968. N = 640 (SEE FOOTNOTE 8)

Approval of Marriage Between Jews and Non-Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approval of Marriage Between Whites and Non-Whites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In July of 1969, CIPO asked,

When you hear anything about the dispute between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, do you find yourself sympathetic more with one side than the other—and, if so, which?

Few Canadians of either group expressed sympathy for the Arabs (eight percent of the English, eleven percent of the French), but thirty-two percent of English Canadians expressed sympathy for the Jews while only seven percent of the French would commit themselves in this way (a majority of both groups would not express itself either way.) (See Table 5).

**TABLE 5. CIPO 336, JULY 1969. N = 604 (8)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Arabs</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Jews</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In November of 1973, shortly after the Yom Kippur War, the question asked was simply,

Do you find yourself more in sympathy with the Arabs or with the Israelis?

Sympathy for the Arabs was very low at that time, possibly because of the energy crisis: five percent of English Canadians, and only three percent of the French. (See Table 6). The majority, again, would take no sides either way, but twenty-eight percent of the English, and only eleven percent of the French expressed sympathies for Israel.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Arabs</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Israelis</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1974, Berry, Kalin, and Taylor (1976: Chapter 5 and passim) probed attitudes toward Jews held by French and English Canadians as part of a study.
on multiculturalism. The published report is fully congruent with the major findings which I report here, viz. that French Canadians are clearly more negative in their attitudes than English Canadians. 79

The final survey on which I can report inquired about opinions concerning the anti-Zionist resolution of the UN General Assembly. (See Table 7). In December of 1975, CIPO asked

Do you believe that Zionism—that is the belief in or the movement for a Jewish national state—is or is not a form of racism?

The analysis of replies to this question gives somewhat ambiguous results, partly because many people refused to answer the question altogether. But if we take only those answering the question, we find that the same percentage—forty-six—approved of the UN resolution among both English and French Canadians. On the other hand, when the same sample was asked whether it approved of the Canadian government’s action in protesting against the UN resolution, thirty-nine percent of the English, but only twenty-seven percent of the French approved of the protest. So it would seem, despite the problems of interpretation here, that in balance English Canadians showed themselves again significantly more friendly toward Israel.

TABLE 7. CIPO 383, DECEMBER 1975. N = 908 (8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Zionism is Racism”</th>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approval of Canadian Protest Against UN resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Respondents</th>
<th>French Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey studies which we have looked at rather briefly so far may now be analyzed more intensely for answers to the following questions:

1) Are the differences between French and English Canadians significant in a statistical sense?
2) What is the magnitude of the effect of mother tongue (French versus English ethnicity) on attitudes toward things Jewish, when compared to the effect of such other variables as social class?

3) Is the effect of mother tongue perhaps spurious, i.e. better explained by some third factor such as religion or social class?

4) If we find that the different age and social-class groupings within English Canada react differently to questions relating to Jews, will we find similar age and social-class differences among French Canadians?

Table 8 is designed to suggest answers to the first three of these questions. Table 9 to the third and fourth, and Figure I to the fourth. These analyses are for data from 1969 (CIPO #336) and 1973 (CIPO #362). The range of categories in previous tables has been collapsed to consider only pro-Israel sentiment in contrast to all other responses. The basic data behind these tables and the figure, then, constitute a measure of whether or not respondents expressed sympathy for the Israel side in the Middle East conflict in 1969 and 1973.

**TABLE 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G</td>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>Who More Pro Israel</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>Who More Pro Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Age</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Education</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Income</td>
<td>(Not Avail. for 1969)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Religion</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Protest.</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) (Controlled for Lang.)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Language</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) (Controlled for Educ.)</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) (Controlled for Income)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G = gamma
SIG = significance as measured by chi square

The question of statistical significance of the difference between French and English respondents can be answered rather simply on line (6) of columns (2) and (5) of Table 8. The measure of significance is chi square, which shows significant differences, at the one percent level, for both 1969 and 1973. We can be fairly
confident, therefore, that samples showing such differences could not have been
drawn by chance alone, especially not repeatedly.\(^{12}\)

The question of the magnitude of the effect of ethnicity (measured by mother
tongue) cannot be answered quite as simply. The reader should have an idea of
how much difference this ethnicity makes by recalling differences in the
percentages as shown on Tables 1 through 7. My own impression is that these
differences range from small to medium; they are almost never dramatic, but they
are persistent and fairly consistent.

In Table 8, an attempt is made to throw light on the magnitude of these
differences by contrasting them to the effects of other factors. This is done in
columns (1) and (4), which use \textit{gamma} ("G") as a measure of relationship
between variables. We note, on line (6), that the effect of language is larger than is
that of either age, education, income, or religion (lines 1 through 4), for each of
the two years studied. (No measure for income was available for 1969). We may
conclude that although the difference on this question between the two major
Canadian language groups is not dramatic, it is larger than are the differences
between any age or social-class groupings.

The (zero-order) effect of religion is almost as great as is that of language. But
since almost all French Canadians are Catholics rather than Protestants, one
would naturally suspect that the difference apparently due to religion is actually
due mostly to the difference in language. This supposition is confirmed by the
partial gammas on line (5): when the effect of language is held constant, the
relationship between religion and favourable attitudes toward Israel is largely,
though not completely, wiped out.

Any substantial independent effect of religion was further ruled out in separate
analyses, by language groups, of the relationship between religion and pro-Israel
attitudes. (These tabulations are not shown here). Among the English, Protest-
tants were only slightly more pro-Israel than Catholics in 1973 (29% versus 24%); amon
the French, the number of Protestants was so small—only eight in the
1973 sample—that no meaningful comparison could be made. In 1967, pro-Israel
attitudes among English Protestants, again, was only very slightly higher than
among English Catholics (32% versus 27%). We can confirm, therefore, that the
magnitude of an independent effect of religion, though perceptible, is much
smaller than that of ethnicity (mother tongue).

The third of the questions we have posed is perhaps the most important: is it
possible to rule out the effect of mother tongue by showing it to be an artifact of
social class? We have both education and income as social class indicators in
these studies, and we know (lines 2 and 3 of Table 8) that both bear some relation-
ship to positive attitudes toward Israel. Since French Canadians are known to
rank somewhat lower on these social-class variables (see below), it is important
to ask whether it is the lower social class, rather than French ethnicity, which
must be used as the explanatory factor for the lower levels of friendliness to
Israel.

Lines (7) and (8) show the partial gammas: these indicate that after controlling
for the social-class indicators, the relationship between ethnicity (mother tongue) and
the attitudes here discussed remains unimpaired. This is true for both 1969

The independent effect of ethnicity, as measured in these studies, is further
confirmed by observing the separate age-education sub-groups in Table 9. We have twelve such sub-groups for each of the language groups for 1973, and eight for 1969. The relevant comparisons lie on each of the lines of columns (3) and (4) for 1969, and on each of the lines of columns (5) and (6) for 1973. We can see, for example, that fifteen percent of the English teen-age low-education respondents,

**TABLE 9**

Percentage of Respondents Who Favor Israel, by Age-Education Sub-Groups

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) 18-19</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) 20-29</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
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<td>(6)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(33)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(45)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
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<td>(11)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(20)</td>
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</table>

**Glossary for Table 9**

A Sample contained none under 21
B included in 50-59
(Frequencies are given in parentheses)
versus fourteen percent of the French, favoured Israel in 1973. In all, we can make twenty such comparisons. In eighteen out of these twenty, English respondents show a greater proportion of favorable attitudes. The reader may easily verify that in the two exceptional cases (lines 8 and 10, both for 1969) the comparison would again have favoured the English but for a single respondent in one case and two respondents in the other. If we accept education as a measure of social class, we can see that, with social class thus controlled, mother tongue still determines the level of favourable attitudes toward Israel.

Table 9 gives us data for an approach to the fourth question of this section, viz. that of the internal patterning of opinions within the French and English populations. These data have been combined and plotted on Figure 1 as follows: for each of the four language-educational groupings, a line has been drawn to combine points whose ordinals represent percentage favourable to Israel and whose abscissas represent average year of birth. Following any one line from left to right, therefore, leads us from the older respondents to the younger.

To illustrate the use of this figure, let us follow the lowest line on it, that of French respondents with low educational attainment. We find that thirteen percent of the oldest among these (i.e. of those whose average year of birth is 1909) favour Israel; as we move to the youngest, whose average year of birth is 1949, we find, again, thirteen percent favouring Israel; in-between age groups showed slightly lower percentages. (All data on this figure, as I have said, are pooled from the 1969 and 1973 studies.)

It helps to be aware of the relative numbers of respondents represented in the various lines of the Figure: the total number of English respondents is 1014, 40%
of whom are in the higher educational group; the total number of French is 489, of whom only 22% are of higher education.

An examination of the Figure tells us that the patterning of opinions is indeed different among the four language-education groups. In particular, we note that English-speaking groups divide on age effects: for the better educated, age does not matter; among those of lower education, the young are less often for Israel than are their elders. But neither of the French groups shows conspicuous age effects. (The very high level apparent among the older better-educated French represent data which are less reliable than are the other points of the Figure because of the very small number of individuals represented in these particular sub-groups. These frequencies are shown, in parentheses, on Table 9).

Next, we note that the young of all the four groups are more similar to one another than are their elders. Most particularly, the low-education young among the English and the French show almost the same level in pro-Israel attitudes. We may say that the ethnic division breaks down at this point.

This similarity between these groups of young people has at least two contrasting interpretations. If we assume that the future will be similar to the past, we may speculate that when young, less-educated people of both ethnic groups are relatively indifferent to matters such as Israel, but develop, in the case of the English but not of the French, a sympathetic interest as they get older. If, on the other hand, we assume that the future will be different from the past, we could surmise that whereas the less educated differed along ethnic lines on such matters in the past, the future, as represented by the young, will bring about a relative weakening of ethnic differences. Only future studies can decide between these two interpretations.

Finally, we must note the consistent separateness of the last line on the Figure, that of the French Canadians with less-than-high-school education. This group happens to comprise seventy-eight percent of the total French sample. Unlike the higher-educated French, whose line crisscrosses those of the English and may thus be thought of as more assimilated to English-speaking Canada from the present point of view, the less educated French are here seen as showing a consistent ethnic distinctiveness.

* * *

We may now attempt to draw some conclusions.

While the historical literature which I cited is quite clear about the rather prominent place of anti-Semitism in the French Canadian tradition, the direct evidence examined in this paper does not confirm anything that can properly be termed hostility to Jews. It does indicate clearly, however, that when compared to English Canadians, French Canadians are less prone to favour things Jewish.

One might hypothesize two contrasting sources for this difference: a) a greater influence of progressivist or left-wing opposition to Israel; or b) a tradition-related distancing from things Jewish, explainable in terms of French Canadian culture rather than in terms of up-to-date political ideologies.

The statements by current French Canadian nationalist leaders who are hostile to Israel are couched in progressivist rather than in traditionalist terms. But I would now argue that French Canadian public opinion on this matter is better explained by a traditionalistic, as opposed to progressivist, interpretation. I
draw this conclusion from the material summarized in Figure 1. The backbone of the French particularistic attitudes toward Israel—much lower levels of friendliness than any other population sub-group here studied—can be found in the less educated majority of the French Canadian population. It seems reasonable to assume that progressivist and left-wing opposition to Israel would find support among those with at least a high school education; but the fact is that these more educated people support Israel in numbers approaching the English levels.

We must hope, finally, for comparative studies in the future to confirm some of the interpretations offered in this paper. But in the meantime we can assert with a fair degree of confidence that the English-French ethnic factor in Canada has greater consequences for attitudes toward things Jewish than do either social class or religion. It is a fair hypothesis that this relatively greater salience of the ethnic factor will extend to a variety of public opinion issues.

**FOOTNOTES**

1. I am most grateful to David Amos, Meg Holsworth and Laine Ruus for help in locating unpublished data.
3. Figures computed from Table 4.7 of Kalbach (1970:166-67).
5. See Levesque, 1972; Wisse and Cotler, 1977. For Jewish reactions, see Kardonne (1975), Cohen (1977), Wisse and Cotler (1977), and Weinfeld (1977). (Kardonne's account of the Levesque statement, unfortunately, is badly distorted) The most complete and most balanced discussion by a Jewish spokesman is that of Waller (1978). Levesque's opinions, taken by themselves, are not hostile to Jews as such; they are hostile to the Israeli side of the Israel-Arab conflict. However, many Jewish readers of the Levesque statement thought it noteworthy that he chose an occasion particularly painful for the Jewish people—the massacre of Jewish athletes in the home town of the Nazi movement—to express sympathies for the Arabs. Not all P.Q. leaders can be called hostile to either Israel or the Jews; some are on record as conspicuous friends of both. But there are enough hostile statements to have caused alarm. (Wisse and Cotler, 1977). The greatest concern seems to be that, while the style and form of such statements are modern and free from overt anti-Semitism, they may in fact constitute a new manifestation of the older anti-Semitic aspect of French Canadian nationalism.
6. Much more extensive data exist for the United States; see the review article by Lipset and Schneider (1977).
7. The results have been published in a number of articles by J. A. Laponce. Here, I am using unpublished data contained in Laponce (1966). I give more detail on Table 2. Laponce has pointed out to me that these data, while helpful in the present context, are not derived from scientifically-selected samples of the populations in question.
8. When using this and the following CIPO studies, the differentiation between English and French Canadians could only be established from a question on mother tongue. When the answer was neither French nor English, I have deleted the case from the sample. The total "N" reported by me on top of each table therefore represents only the number of respondents giving either English or French as mother tongue.
9a. CIPO again asked questions relating to inter-marriage in 1973 and 1978 (Vancouver
Sun, 1978). Overall approval of inter-marriage increased both times in the total popula-
tion. But since these studies were not available to me for secondary analysis at the time of
this writing, I cannot report on French-English differences for these occasions.

9b. These authors report an "overall" measure (pp. 107, and passim) which indicates that
French Canadians are less positive not only to Jews but to most other minority groups as
well. But this overall measure contains rather heterogeneous material. On the one question
which relates most directly to the issue at hand—how "likeable" members of other groups
are—French Canadians single out Jews and Ukrainians as particularly lacking. English
Canadians, by contrast, do not find any groups exceptionally unlikeable. (Berry, Kalin,
and Taylor, pp. 116, 118).

10. It would have been better, perhaps, to subject each one of the studies to the kind of detailed
    treatment which I am about to give to only two. But only these two were directly compar-
    able in the questions they asked and could therefore be combined. Together, these two pro-
    vide certain answers which none could have given singly.

11. Other simplifying re-codings, in the preparation of Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 1, are the
    following: original data on educational level had to be dichotomized to yield "less than
    high school graduation" versus all levels higher than that; analyses of religion exclude all
    respondents other than Protestant and Catholics. The purpose of all these simplifying
    procedures was the creation of transformed variables which could all be considered as
    ordinal rather than merely nominal. This makes it possible, for example, to compute
    gammas. Please refer to Note (12), below.

12. Here and elsewhere in this article I employ some statistical terms which may not be fully
    familiar to every reader. All such terms are explained in Nie, et al. (1975), which is an
    exceptionally easy-to-understand reference work for the non-specialist.

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